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ENTITIES IN CONTRACTS AND 
STATUTES: 
A PROACTIVE AND 
PREVENTATIVE APPROACH 
"The sine qua non of a life in the law is a willingness to devote 
a great deal of thought to issues which seldom concern 
nonlawyers."l 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of a hospitality entity, such as a "restaurant" 
or "hotel," is something that ordinary people (non-lawyers) 
have little difficulty describing, but which has long created a 
legal quandary for attorneys, courts, and legislatures. The 
struggle to specifically discern the nature of certain hospitality 
entities is the bane of hospitality law, particularly inns, hotels, 
and motels from the lodging segment, and restaurants, 
nightclubs, bars, and cabarets from the food and beverage 
spectrum. 
Statutes and contracts use hospitality classifications and 
definitions to accomplish particular objectives.2 For example, 
to minimize neighborhood noise and traffic problems, a lease 
may restrict the use of the premises for a "nightclub," but allow 
1 Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10·11 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1998). 
2 JACKP. JEFFERIES, UNDERSTANDING HOSPITALITY LAW 6 (3rd ed.1995). 
105 
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"restaurant" activity.3 A breach of the lease becomes 
debatable, however, when components detailing the definition 
of "restaurant" or "nightclub" are omitted. Would the 
restaurant owner breach the lease for operating a non-
permitted nightclub if she served alcoholic beverages and 
allowed dancing? Like many hospitality entities, nightclubs 
and restaurants share similar elements.4 In the absence of 
specific terms, reasonable minds differ as to the definitions.5 
The multiplicity and diversity of characteristics in the 
modern hospitality industry contribute to the foggy nature of 
hospitality definitions. As a result, the parties often 
unintentionally violate the law or infringe a contract.6 For 
instance, in State v. Shoaf, suit was brought against an owner 
to enforce a public law that restricted the sale of goods on 
Sundays.7 The applicable statute, which exempted 
"restaurants" and "cafes," did not narrowly define either term.S 
The state believed that the owner's business was a "wiener 
joint," not a true "restaurant," because there were no tables 
and he sold only hotdogs and sandwiches at a counter.9 
Referencing historical definitions from a dictionary, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina found the premises was a 
"restaurant."lO The court reasoned that the word "restaurant" 
is commonly understood as "a place where refreshments can be 
had,"ll whereas a "joint" is a rendezvous "for persons engaged 
in evil and secret practices of any kind ... as is usually kept by 
Chinese for the accommodation of persons addicted to the habit 
of opium."12 This interpretation protected the business from 
closing on Sundays.13 Elusive definitions of hospitality entities, 
3 Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. App. 1989). 
4 Id. at 864. 
5 Id. 
6 State v. Shoaf, 102 S.E. 705 (N.C. 1920). 
7 Id. 
BId. at 706. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 705. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 706. 
13 Id. The court found that the policy of the statute barring restaurants from 
opening on Sunday was not violated, because the owner did not "mar in the least the 
proper and peaceful observance of the Sabbath." Id. 
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such as the distinctions between a "wiener joint" and a 
"restaurant," often create confusion and lead to litigation,14 
Litigants often argue that a hospitality term in a contract 
or statute is too vague to be enforced.15 When interpreting a 
vague term, however, courts make every effort to discern the 
intent of the parties from the remnants of the contract or 
statute. 16 Accordingly, courts construe vague or undefined 
hospitality terms utilized in contracts and statutes by their 
"commonly understood meanings."17 This is a difficult task for 
courts, because hospitality entities have nebulous "commonly 
understood meanings" due to the numerous characteristics 
they share.18 Adding to the confusion, the evolution of legal 
language and colloquial language is not always concurrent.19 
The mountain of judicial opinions attempting to establish 
"commonly understood meanings" of hospitality entities is 
indicative of the difficulty courts have in distinguishing 
between them. 
Likewise, the consequences of after-the-fact judicial 
interpretation of the definition of an entity can be severe.20 
Courts will not interpret the definition of an entity where it is 
unambiguous.21 To best prevent litigation, definitions should 
be composed with clear and specific terms.22 Utilizing 
restrictive covenants and permitted uses in the definition 
allows drafters to explicitly describe the permitted operations 
of hospitality entities. In addition to achieving the objectives 
of the statute or contract, affected parties will easily 
14 See generally State v. Shoaf, 102 S.E. 705 (N.C. 1920). 
15 Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App. 1989). 
16 Id at 866. 
17 See generally JACK P. JEFFERIES, UNDERSTANDING HOSPITALITY LAw 6 (3rd ed. 
1995); Oak Hills Prop. v. Saga Rest. Inc, 940 S.W.2d 243,245 (Tex. App. 1997); Adams 
v. Fazzio Real Estate Co., 268 F. Supp. 630, 635 (E.D. La. 1967). 
18 See generally Montella v. City of Ottertail, 633 N.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001). The court struggled to determine if a business that sold desserts and coffee was 
a "restaurant" under a liquor license statute. Id. 
19 See generally Cromwell v. Stephens 2 Daly (N.Y.) 15, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. 
Co. 1867), reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993). 
20 Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. App. 1989). The trial 
court issued a permanent injunction that enjoined the business from operating as a 
"nightclUb." [d. 
21 . Roe v. Hopper, 408 P.2d 161, 164 (Idaho 1965). 
22 Vitolo V. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). It is often difficult for 
courts to tell whether the business is the allowable entity or only of the same character 
as the allowable entity (hence allowable only by exception). For example, is a "diner" a 
"restaurant" or just in the nature of a "restaurant?" Id. 
3
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understand the operational scope of the entity that they are 
expected to run.23 
This Comment serves as a guide to contracting parties and 
legislative drafters to initially, in an accurate and descriptive 
manner, define the scope of the entity, and thus, avoid 
litigation. Additionally, the factors enumerated through 
permissive uses and restrictive covenants (such as a dancing or 
minimum stay requirement) if utilized, will enhance the 
enforceability of the statutes and contractual restrictive 
covenants. 
Part I describes the general background of the need for 
specificity in arriving at definitions for hospitality entities.24 
Part II explains why the court's use of historical definitions in 
interpreting vague or missing definitions of hospitality 
establishments in contracts and statutes is unsound.25 Part III 
examines why an entity's characteristics are relevant, focusing 
on specific issues arising in contractual and statutory arenas.26 
Part IV provides a logical progression for clearly defining each 
term of art by the use of specific permissive and restrictive 
covenants.27 Part V concludes that a proactive utilization of 
these covenants by all affected stakeholders prevents 
litigation.2B 
1. BACKGROUND 
Early hospitality entities were much simpler to classify 
than the melange of entities comprising the industry today.29 
It appears that all present day hospitality entities evolved from 
an "inn," but even the concept of an "inn" took a long time to 
develop. 30 In the ancient Middle East, empty huts gave shelter 
to traders along caravan stopS.31 In the Middle Ages, 
23 See generally Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. App. 
1989). 
24 See infra notes 29 ·66 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 67·108 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 109·191 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra accompanying text and chart. 
28 See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
29 See generally Cromwell v. Stephens 2 Daly (N.Y.) 15, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. 
Co. 1867), reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993). 
80 Id. 
3! Inn, ENCYCLOPEDIA. COM, available at 
<http://www.encyclopedia.comihtml/illinn.asp.> (last visited Sept.14, 2002). 
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monasteries established hospices to fulfill the Christian duty of 
hospitality by providing accommodations and food for 
travelers. 32 Less primitive inns arrived by the sixteenth 
century.33 Beginning in this period, guests, in addition to 
receiving overnight accommodations, expected greater services 
such as a place to stable their horse and a supply of food and 
drink during their stay.34 
Hotels opening in the early 1800's enhanced the public's 
accommodation by providing not only rooms for the night, but 
also food and beverage service, soap and water for each room, 
bellboys, and room service.35 The infant industry blossomed 
with the industrial revolution, automobiles, and cross-country 
highways. 36 In addition, the engine of technology improved 
services with inventions such as indoor plumbing and 
refrigerators. 37 As a result, guests anticipated broad-based 
facilities including retail outlets, in-house laundry, garage 
facilities, and entertainment. 38 
As the concept of public accommodation continued to 
evolve, numerous characteristics among traditionally separate 
entities applied to new entities.39 Soon after, conflicts arose 
concerning the classifications of hospitality entities. In 1905, a 
plaintiff, who had been living in the Ten Eyck Annex, a hotel in 
New York, for seventeen months, brought a liability suit for 
lost and damaged property.40 She argued that the Ten Eyck 
Annex had many of the same characteristics of an "inn" and 
was, accordingly, subject to liability laws that only applied to 
inns.41 The hotel argued that, historically, transient guests 
32 Cromwell v. Stephens 2 Daly (N.Y.) 15, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. Co. 1867), 
reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAwS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993). 
33 WILLIAM S. GRAY, HOTEL AND MOTEL MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS 3-4 (3rd ed 
1994). 
34 [d. 
35 John Mariani, A Look Back: milestones in the hospitality industry history, HOTEL 
& MOTEL MANAGEMENT, June 5, 2000; WILLIAM S. GRAY, HOTEL AND MOTEL 
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS 5·6 (3rd ed 1994). 
36 See generally John Mariani, Roadside Attractions; History of Diners, RESTAURANT 
HOSPITALITY, May, 1992. 
37 [d. 
38 See generally WILLIAM S. GRAY, HOTEL AND MOTEL MANAGEMENT AND 
OPERATIONS 156·162 (3rd ed 1994). 
39 See generally YMCA of Greater N.Y. McBurney Branch V. Plotkin, 519 N.Y.S.2d 
518 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987). 
40 Crapo V. Rockwell, 48 Misc. 1, 5 (N.Y. Trial Term 1905). 
41 See generally [d. 
5
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stayed at inns while hotels tended to house long term guests or 
"tenants."42 If the court classified the Ten Eyck Annex as an 
"inn," the owner, as the insurer of a transient guest's property 
pursuant to the concept of infra hospitium,43 would be liable for 
the plaintiffs loss under common law.44 To determine if the 
Ten Eyck Annex corresponde'd to the commonly understood 
meaning of "inn," the court examined historical definitions of 
the term.45 The New York Supreme Court, relying on historical 
definitions, found that an "inn" was always used in connection 
with the corresponding notion of travelers (transient guests) 
seeking accommodation and protection.46 The plaintiff was 
more in the nature of a tenant at the hotel rather than a 
transient guest of an "inn."47 Accordingly, the hotel was not 
liable for the woman's property.48 If the facts of this case were 
considered today, a different outcome would most likely result, 
because hotels have evolved from long term tenancies into 
transient guest lodging. 
More recently, courts have had increasing difficulty 
defining entities pursuant to the industry's constant evolution. 
For example, in the hotel sector, a facility with rooms, outfitted 
with spas and mirrored ceilings, are rented to members in four-
hour blocks.49 If the court regarded the premises as a "hotel" or 
a "motel," an occupancy tax of five percent would apply. 50 
Although many properties defined as hotels do not require an 
overnight stay,51 a federal appellate court held that the entity 
was not a "hotel" or a "motel," but a "private place of enhanced 
romantic surroundings for sexual activity between two 
persons" and, accordingly, not subject to the tax.52 
42 Id. at 4. 
43 STEPHEN BARTH, HOSPITALITY LAw, John Wiley and Sons, 271 (2001). 
Historically, the common law held a hotel liable for the loss of the guest's property if 
the property and the guest were within the premises of the hotel. The concept was infra 
hospitium a Latin term meaning "within the hotel." Id. 
44 Crapo v. Rockwell, 48 Misc. 1, 2 (N.Y. Trial Term 1905). 
45 Id. at 4. Historical definitions are often analyzed to discover a commonly 
understood meaning. Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 8. 
48 Id. 
49 Lucio Guerrero, Is Getaway a Hotel, There's No Telling, CHICAGO SUN·TIMES 
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The conception of food and beverage entities evolves at a 
pace as rapidly as the lodging sector. The first restaurants, 
independent of inns, that operated with a shade of modernity, 
with private tables and a somewhat varied menu, appeared in 
France in the late eighteenth century.53 In America, customary 
restaurant entities did not develop until 1838 when the Swiss 
Del-Monico brothers opened the still-famous Delmonico's 
restaurant in New York. 54 As modern variations of restaurants 
mushroomed in America, disagreements and resulting 
litigation arose over the characteristics of eating and drinking 
establishments.55 As early as 1859, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire questioned whether a saloon serving only beer and 
oysters matched the definition of a "restaurant" within a city 
ordinance. 56 The ordinance did not allow any person to "keep 
open any restaurant, or any place used as a restaurant, in the 
city, in the night, after ten o'clock."57 The court held that the 
saloon was a restaurant even though no definition of 
"restaurant" was detailed in the ordinance. 58 As a result, the 
owner was not allowed to operate his business past ten 
o'clock. 59 
Changes in modes of life, travel and transportation 
continue to modify the composition of hospitality entities and 
consequently, their definitions.60 The explosion of creativity in 
the industry over the years has resulted in shared common 
. characteristics between traditionally separate entities. For 
example, if you linger too long in Miyagi's Sushi Restaurant in 
Los Angeles, California, you may find yourself suddenly 
transported to a nightclub as the temperature inside gently 
rises, the music becomes increasingly louder, and patrons start 
to dance. The restaurant transforms into a nightclub for all 
intents and purposes. 
53 Restaurant, ENCYCLOPEDIA. COM, available at 
<http://www.encyclopedia.com/htmllrllrestaura.asp.> (last visited Sept. 14, 2002). 
54 Anthony Conners, Delmonico's Lives Again, DAILY NEWS SUNDAY EXTRA, May 17, 
1998, at 52. 
55 See generally State v. Freeman, 38 N.H. 426 (N.H. 1859). 
56 [d. 
57 State v. Freeman, 38 N.H. 426, 426 (N.H. 1859). 
58 [d. at 427. 
59 [d. at 428. 
·60 Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119, 121 (W.D. Wash. 1947). 
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Due to creative conceptualization, present-day hospitality 
entities are not as conventional or as easily distinguishable 
from each other as they once were. 61 Yet, contracts and 
statutes continue to define entities ambiguously, forcing the 
courts to look elsewhere to interpret intent and construct 
definitions.62 When the court is interpreting an imprecise term 
in a contract or statute, the court must unearth and apply the 
commonly understood meaning of the term.63 As previously 
revealed, however, commonly understood meanings in the 
hospitality industry are not so common any longer.64 In spite of 
this, modern day courts continually utilize outdated historical 
definitions to ascertain commonly understood meanings of 
hospitality entities,65 even though it was held, almost one 
hundred years ago, that adherence to ancient definitions of 
hospitality entities is not an effective practice.66 
II. PROBLEMATIC HISTORICAL DEFINITIONS 
Inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, bars, nightclubs and 
cabarets are the hospitality terms of art that tend to create the 
most confusion. In addition to overlapping characteristics, 
several historical definitions can be found for each hospitality 
entity further complicating the courts application of dated 
historical definitions. The following are typical ambiguous 
historical definitions and illustrative cases in which courts 
utilize unbridled discretion to reach extraordinary judicial 
interpretation. 
61 See generally John Mariani, Roadside Attractions; History of Diners, RESTAURANT 
HOSPITALITY, May, 1992. 
62 See generally Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119, 120 (W.D. Wash. 1947); Vitolo 
v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). 
63 See generally Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). 
64 Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119, 120 (W.D. Wash. 1947). In this case, the 
court found that the historical definitions between hotel and apartment-house were so 
similar that they were not helpful. Id. 
65 Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 57-8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). The court looked to 
dictionaries to find the definition of "restaurant" and "drive-in." If these definitions had 
been taken seriously, the court would have held that a "drive-in" is a "restaurant" 
without parking spaces. Id. 
66 Nelson v. Johnson, 116 N.W. 828, 829 (Minn. 1908). 
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A. INN 
One historical definition described an "inn" as "[a] house 
for entertainment of travelers and passengers, in which a 
lodging and necessities are provided for them and for their 
horses and attendants."67 This definition conceives a "hotel" as 
an entity independent of an "inn."68 Contrast this with the 
opinion in YMCA of Greater N. Y. McBurney Branch v. Plotkin, 
which found that "hotel" is tantamount to "inn."69 In that case, 
to recover rent overcharges and treble damages, pursuant to a 
statute regulating hotels requiring the posting of a room rate, 
the court required the plaintiff to prove that the YMCA was 
operating as either a "hotel" or an "inn."70 The New York Civil 
Court found the YMCA was subject to this statute, reasoning 
that the facility rents rooms to transient guests in conjunction 
with the commonly understood meaning of hotel or inn.71 
Although it was only a peripheral issue in this case, the court 
stated that the terms "hotel" and "inn" were synonymous and 
refer to places where "transient guests are received and 
lodged."72 Despite decisions like this, the distinctions between 
"hotel" and "inn" are often embraced in other cases.73 
B. HOTEL 
Black's Law Dictionary defines a hotel as "[a] building 
where lodging and usually meals, entertainment and various 
personal services are provided for the public."74 An airport, 
casino, homeless shelter or even a shopping mall could fit 
within this definition.75 Similarly, in Greentree at Murray Hill 
Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, a group of 
67 Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N.Y) 25, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P.N.Y. Co. 1867), 
referencing Thompson V. Lacy (3 B. & A 238), reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE 
LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993). 
68 Id. 




72 Id. cited in Dixon V. Robbins 246 N.Y. 169 (1927). 
73 Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17,23 (N.J. 1955). 
74 THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 359 (New ed.1994). 
75 West Edmonton Mall in Edmonton, Alberta provides a hotel, 3. movies theatres, 
ice skating rink and many attractions. <http://www.westedmall.com> (last visited Feb. 
20,2003). 
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condominium owners attempted to enjoin a neighboring church 
for operating as a non-permitted "hotel" under a city zoning 
ordinance. 76 The plaintiffs argued that by housing the 
homeless, the church's charity was tantamount to the operation 
of a hotel.77 Using a dictionary for guidance, the New York 
Supreme Court declared the commonly understood definition of 
a hotel to be "a house which is held out to well-behaved 
members of the traveling public, who are willing to pay 
reasonable rates for accommodations, as a place where they 
will be received and entertained as guests for compensation, 
and will be furnished with food, drink, and lodging, and 
everything which they have occasion for while on their way."78 
The court inferred that sleeping accommodations for 
compensation, twenty-four hour desk, bellboy or telephone 
service are prerequisites, set out by the historical definition, to 
constitute a "hotel."79 These characteristics were absent from 
the homeless shelter.8o Accordingly, the court viewed the 
shelter as merely a permissible accessory use to the church; the 
operation ofthe homeless shelter could continwi.81 
C. MOTEL 
One dictionary defines a motel as, "[a] hotel in which the 
rooms are accessible from the parking area,"82 while another 
finds that a "hotel and motel are interchangeable and refers to 
places that provide overnight accommodations to transients."83 
The language "overnight accommodations to transients" can 
encompass any sort of public accommodation, even 
campgrounds. In a Rhode Island case, a developer sued a 
zoning review board to allow the construction of a motel. 84 The 
plaintiff argued that since a hotel was a permitted use, a motel 
76 Greentree at Murray Hill Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550 
N.y'S.2d 981,984 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
77 Id. at 985. 




82 THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 480 (New ed.1994). (Emphasis added). 
83 NORMAN G. COURNOYER ET AL., HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND TRAVEL LAW 572 (5th 
Edition 1998). 
84 Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the City of Cranston, 138 A.2d 818, 
823 (H.1. 1958). 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/2
2003] HOSPITALITY ENTITIES IN CONTRACTS 115 
should also be permitted.85 The Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island did not refer to any historical definitions before it held 
that a motel was the equivalent of a hotel. 86 The court 
explained that in the absence of any specific definitions 
contrary to this notion, a motel was a permissible use and could 
be constructed.87 
D. RESTAURANT 
One historical definition states that a restaurant is " [a] 
place where meals are served to the public."88 Many entities 
can be classified as a "restaurant" under this definition, 
including a soup kitchen, cafe, hotdog stand, grocery store, or 
even a bowling alley. The tenant's lease in Fulway Corp. u. 
Liggett Drug Company involved a restrictive covenant that 
prohibited the premises to operate as a luncheonette with a 
soda fountain.89 The lease was silent as to whether the 
premises could be used as a "restaurant."90 The New York 
Civil Court, however, considered several definitions and held 
that a restaurant is "a place which serves, through waiters or 
waitresses, full meals or food specialties, totally or principally 
at tables, in comfortable surroundings, and where the food is 
not prepared, cooked and served from apparatus open and 
visible to the customer."91 A luncheonette would seem to 
embody this definition. The New York Civil Court, using its 
discretion, distinguished the entities.92 Reasoning that 
"restaurant service was intended to be leisurely, whereas ... 
luncheonette service" is swift with a high customer turnover, 





88 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1108 (New 
College ed. 1976). 
89 Fulway Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225-6 (N.Y. Special Term 
1956). 
90 Id. at 226. 
91 Id. at 230. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 231. 
11
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E. BAR OR BARROOM 
A dictionary defines a bar as "[a] room or entity whose 
main feature is a bar for the sale of liquor."94 This elusive 
definition encompasses a wide variety of businesses selling 
liquor such as wineries, nightclubs, cabarets, some restaurants 
and possibly liquor stores. When an ordinance in Hall Drive 
Ins, Inc., v. City Ft. Wayne restricted smoking in "restaurants," 
but did allow smoking in ''bars,'' the Indiana Supreme Court 
analyzed whether the city correctly charged the plaintiff with 
violating the ordinance when he allowed smoking in his 
restaurant's bar.95 Although shared characteristics easily 
muddy the water of an entity's definitions, the court noted that 
the restaurant's bar was not in a separate enclosure.96 
Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the bar 
exception to the smoking ordinance did not apply to this 
"restaurant."97 
F. NIGHTCLUB 
Webster's dictionary defines a nightclub as, "[a] place of 
entertainment open at night usually serving food and liquor 
and providing music for dancing."98 Restaurants, bars, 
cabarets, cruise ships and even resorts often contain all of 
these characteristics. In Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's Inc., a 
city sued a defendant who converted a restaurant into a non-
permitted discotheque.99 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
acknowledged that "discotheque" was a new entity in the 
hospitality industry and had characteristics that the court was 
not readily familiar with. loO As a result, the court struggled to 
find the common meaning of "discotheque."lol The introduction 
of new entities into the marketplace presents difficulties for 
courts to employ any definition. Initially, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court examined dictionary definitions and found that 
94 THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 73 (New ed. 1994). 
95 Hall Drive Ins, Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 773 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2002). 
96 [d. at 259. 
97 [d. 
98 THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 497 (New ed. 1994). 
99 Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's Inc., 416 A.2d 388, 389 (N.J. 1980). 
100 [d. at 389. 
101 [d. at 389·90. 
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"a discotheque is a small intimate nightclub for dancing to 
recorded music; broadly: a nightclub often featuring 
psychedelic and mixed-media attractions (as slides, movies and 
special lighting effects). "102 To justify its decision, the court 
held that hospitality entities must be analyzed in their totality 
by focusing on the "quality, character and intensity of the use," 
instead of on historical definitions.103 Therefore, the court held 
that the entity was a "discotheque" because of the number of 
tables, the music volume, how it was advertised, the presence 
of a cover charge, and that the primary purpose was for 
dancing.l04 Since discotheques were a non-permitted use, the 
court found the defendant in violation of the city's zoning 
ordinance and required him to apply for a zoning variance to 
continue operating. l05 
G. CABARET 
Although nude dancing is historically the primary purpose 
of a cabaret, one dictionary defines a "cabaret" as identical with 
a "nightclub."106 The owner of a nude dancing club challenged 
the constitutionality of an ordinance requiring licenses for 
adult cabarets. l07 The city ordinance defined a cabaret as an 
entity intending to "sexually stimulate any member of the 
public."108 This proposed definition could include the 
restaurant Hooters, any nightclub with professional dancers, 
stores with erotic literature, and potentially movie houses. 
III. CONFUSION OF THE ENTITIES AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
This Comment accounts for the amorphous character of the 
industry and strives to guide individuals, businesses and 
legislative bodies in composing sound definitions. By properly 
defining and utilizing explicit restrictive covenants and 
permitted uses, the ability to draft definitions that are 
102 Id. at 390. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 390. 
105 Id. at 393. 
106 THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 176 (New ed. 1994). 
107 See generally Keith Ervin, Adult Entertainment Returns to Agenda for Bellevue 
Council, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at Bl. 
108 Id. 
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consistent with the intent of all interested parties is 
enhanced. lo9 The incorporation of restrictive covenants and 
permitted uses into the definition of a hospitality term also 
reduces ambiguity and sets clear parameters for the intended 
business's operation.110 As a result, unintended breaches are 
avoided and the potential for litigation is reduced. 
As demonstrated in Part I,111 increasing urbanization and 
creative conceptualization gave rise to a large number of 
various hospitality entities.1l2 Overlapping characteristics 
often occur in modern hospitality entities, making it almost 
impossible to rely on historical definitions.1l3 These changes in 
modern life require that courts acknowledge the reality of the 
relationship between customer and business, instead of 
adhering to rigid historical definitions.1 l4 Hospitality terms of 
art that ignore the dynamic nature of the entity often result in 
legal conflicts.115 Consequently, modern innovation and its 
confusing collection of hospitality entities necessitate the need 
for clear definitions in statutes and contracts.1l6 
If a contract or statute contains a vague hospitality 
definition, distinguishing among the entities becomes a 
question of fact to be determined by the court.117 As seen in 
Part II,118 ambiguity in hospitality definitions routinely results 
in unpredictable outcomes in the courtroom as the decisions 
are often based on "commonly understood meanings" drawn 
from dated historical definitions.1l9 When authors sufficiently 
define the entity in the contract or statute, however, the court 
must look to that definition alone. l2o 
109 See generally Fulway Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222, (N.Y. Special 
Term 1956). 
110 [d. 
11l See supra notes 29-66 and accompanying text. 
112 See generally Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Wash. 1947). 
113 See generally Fulway Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. Special 
Term 1956). 
114 Nelson v. Johnson, 116 N.W. 828, 829 (Minn. 1908). 
116 See generally [d. 
116 See generally [d. 
117 See generally Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 A.D. 232, 237 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1928). The court uses the circumstances of the conflict, or the intent of the 
parties, or both. [d. 
11B See supra notes 67-108 and accompanying text. 
119 Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 A.D. 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). 
120 Montella v. City of Ottertail, 633 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
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A "restaurant" to most people would not include a machine 
in a hallway which delivers a food item with the push of a 
button. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided a 
vending machine was a "restaurant," because the applicable 
statute specifically stated "food vending machines" were an 
applicable taxable "restaurant" in its definition. 121 By 
specifically listing permitted and restricted uses for a 
particular entity, authors can construct clear and unambiguous 
descripStions of allowable operations and therefore, circumvent 
judicial interpretation or even prevent litigation. 
A. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS IN CONTRACTS 
The customary contractual varieties utilized in the 
hospitality industry where vague legal definitions or terms of 
art frequently give rise to conflict are leases,122 owner or 
management contracts,123 and franchise agreements.l24 
Similarly, in Oak Hills Property v. Saga Restaurants, the 
restaurant owner's sublease provided that access to the 
attached parking easement was available only if the premises 
operated as a restaurant.l25 As the lease did not define a 
"restaurant" explicitly, the court used the commonly 
understood definition.126 The property owner proposed that the 
commonly understood definition of a restaurant was "a 
business establishment which derives at least 51 percent of its 
gross revenues from the sale of food and non-alcoholic 
beverages; and which does not sell alcohol other than as an 
accompaniment to meals or to individuals generally awaiting 
tables for food service in an area of the structure that does not 
exceed 25% of the customer floor area."127 This definition 
121 Cagan's Inc. v. N.H. Dep't. of Revenue Admin., 490 A.2d 1354, 1356 (N.H. 1985). 
The statute further defined a restaurant as an eating establishment where food, food 
products, or beverages including alcoholic beverages are served and for which a charge 
is made. [d. 
122 Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App. 1989). A landlord 
allowed the operation of a "restaurant," but not a "nightclub" on the premises, but did 
not define the mentioned entities. [d. 
123 Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 197 A.2d 59 (Maine 1964). 
124 First & First, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., No. 90·1060 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7432 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
125 Oak Hills Prop. v. Saga Rest. Inc, 940 S.W.2d 243,244 (Tex. App. 1997). 
126 [d. at 245. 
127 [d. at 244·5. 
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encompassed specialized proposals, however, which were 
neither commonly understood meanings, nor terms intended by 
the parties. i28 The court refused to declare the property 
owner's proposed commonly understood meaning and the 
restaurant was allowed to use the parking easement. 129 
Providing a definition detailing acceptable uses or restrictive 
covenants would have prevented this result. 
Other contracts that often give rise to conflicts over terms 
of art in the hospitality industry are management contracts. In 
Thacher Hotel u. Economos, the definition of "hotel" in a statute 
controlling liquor licenses became relevant when the hotel sued 
a manager for breach of a management contract.130 The 
manager contended that the contract was void in light of a 
liquor license statute, which required that licenses be issued 
only to bona fide hotels. 131 The manager reasoned that since 
the entity was not a bona fide hotel it was not entitled to a 
liquor license.132 If this premise was correct, the "management 
contract" dealt with an unlawful enterprise and was therefore 
void,133 The court found that since the statute expressly 
included "eating places controlled by the manager" in its 
definition of bona fide hotel, the contract was enforceable. 134 
Due to the precise definition in the contract, the court 
concluded that the "hotel" was bona fide for the sale of liquor 
consumption on the premises,135 As a result, the court upheld 
the management contract.136 
Definitions of hospitality entities are also relevant in 
franchise agreements. When Dunkin' Donuts attempted to buy 
another donut chain, Mr. Donut, plaintiff consumers asked for 
a preliminary injunction claiming the purchase was an anti-
128 Id. at 244. 
129 Id. 
130 Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 197 A.2d 59 (Maine 1964). 
131 Id. at 60. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. The Maine Revenue Statute defines hotel as "any reputable place operated by 
responsible persons of good reputation, where the public, for a consideration, obtains 
sleeping accommodations and meals under one roof and which has a public dining room 
or rooms operated by the same management open and serving food during the morning, 
afternoon and evening, and a kitchen, apart from the public dining room or rooms, in 
which food is regularly prepared for the public on the same premises." Id. 
135 Id. at 64. 
136 Id. 
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trust violation.137 In determining whether the acquisition 
would lessen competition or create a monopoly in the fast food 
sector, the court heard witnesses testify as to the definition of 
the franchises.138 One expert witness stated that a Dunkin' 
Donuts restaurant does not fall neatly into any single 
hospitality definition because it had characteristics of a bakery, 
sit-down restaurant and fast food enterprise.139 Due in part to 
the entity spanning across many different types of enterprises, 
the court found there were no anticompetitive effects from the 
acquisition. 140 
B. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS IN STATUTES 
Hospitality terms of art and vague legal definitions give 
rise to a wide variety of conflicts in statutes. Conflicts 
generally arise over the application of zoning ordinances 
concerning sexually oriented businesses,141 smoking 
ordinances,142 and granting of liquor licenses.143 
In 1970, a New York zoning board revoked a restaurant's 
building permit.l44 The New York Superior Court examined 
whether the establishment was a "restaurant," which was a 
permitted-use, or a non-permitted "drive-in restaurant."145 
Since precise descriptions of these entities were absent, the 
court analyzed the dictionary definitions to distinguish 
between the terms.146 The inadequacy and vagueness of the 
definitions forced the court to consider attributes like seating 
capacity, permanency of the building, toilet facilities, parking 
facilities, and intercom equipment.147 These characteristics 
137 First & First, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., No. 90·1060, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7432 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
138 See generally Id. at *125·6. 
139 Id. at *130. 
140 Id. at *26l. 
141 Tily B. Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10·11 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998). 
142 Samara Kalk Der, Smoking Debate Heats Up; Restaurateurs Cool to New Rules, 
THE CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at 1A. 
143 Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills, No. 94·L·113, 
1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 930 (Ohio App. Ct. 1990). 
144 Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. App. Div.1970). 
146 Id. at 54·55. 
146 Id. at 57. 
147 Id. at 59. 
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embodied those of a drive-in, which the building lacked.148 As 
the premises did not have any attributes of a non-permitted 
"drive-in restaurant," the building was completed and operated 
as the proposed restaurant. 149 
Other statutory concerns over hospitality entities arise in 
liquor licensing requirements. In Krainic v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals of Willoughby Hills, for example, the city required the 
nightclub to serve a minimal amount of food to its patrons to 
obtain a liquor license.15o The city, however, regarded 
foodservice as effectively turning the nightclub into a 
"restaurant," which was not a permitted use under the 
license. 151 As there were no specific definitions of "restaurant" 
or "nightclub" set forth in the ordinance for guidance, the city 
denied the zoning certificate. 152 Without securing the proper 
licenses first, the proposed nightclub could not be built.153 
Smoking ordinances also present a problem. When 
Madison, Wisconsin passed an ordinance restricting smoking in 
restaurants, some restaurants constructed special ventilated 
rooms costing thousands of dollars to comply with the new 
law.154 A short while later, the city passed another ordinance 
that restricted smoking completely from "restaurants" and the 
newly constructed ventilated rooms became useless. 155 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENTITIES 
Some courts recognize the futility of relying upon historical 
definitions and commonly understood meanings for hospitality 
entities. 156 As a result, these courts evaluate various 
characteristics of the entities to determine whether they fall 
within the scope of the term of art stated in the contract or 
statute. 157 These characteristics include the entity's primary 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 60. 
150 Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills, No. 94-L-1l3, 




154 Samara Kalk Der, Smoking Debate Heats Up; Restaurateurs Cool to New Rules, 
THE CAPITAL TiMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at 1A. 
155 Id. 
156 Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51,57-58 (N.Y. App. Div.1970). 
157 Id. at 59. 
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purpose, the manner in which the entity portrays itself, the 
effects on the surrounding community, the customer base, the 
characteristics of the operation, specified sales percentages, 
and the name used by the entity. Although these 
characteristics are certainly helpful when interpreting the 
commonly understood definition of hospitality entities, they 
still leave too much room for discretionary interpretation. 
1. Primary Purpose 
The primary purpose of an organization is one factor courts 
use to interpret vague or omitted definitions of hospitality 
entities. 158 Utilizing the primary purpose with specificity in 
the definitions promotes a consistent standard. 159 Preventing 
litigation, however, requires a detailed illustration of how the 
premises should be maintained. 160 Interested parties and 
courts understand precisely what conduct is prohibited or 
permitted via restrictive covenants and permitted uses in 
definitions of hospitality entities. 
When using the primary purpose to get desired results, 
authors do not always succeed in incorporating the spirit of the 
agreement. 161 The city of Clifton, New Jersey attempted to 
keep out a 7-Eleven by claiming it was a non-permitted fast-
food entity.162 The zoning board reasoned that since people 
place orders for coffee, muffins and slurpees to go, the entity 
was primarily engaged in preparing fast food. 163 The court 
found that this was not 7-Eleven's primary purpose and the 
business was allowed to operate. 164 Although the fast-food 
ordinance identified its primary purpose, the attempt at 
specificity did not achieve the creator's goals. 165 Instead, the 
158 See generally Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills, 
No. 94-L-113, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 930, at *6 (Ohio App. Ct. 1990). 
159 Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6,11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
160 [d. at 11-12. 
161 See generally Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills, 
No. 94-L-113, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 930, at *6 (Ohio App. Ct. 1990). 
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use of the words "primary purpose" implies that there must 
also be secondary uses. 166 
2. Sales Percentages 
Authors of contracts and statutes often define entities by 
utilizing sales percentages of a certain category, such as food or 
beverage sales. 167 Including sales percentages in a hospitality 
definition is helpful to limit the occurrence of certain activities, 
such as alcoholic beverage consumption or even smoking. 
Madison, Wisconsin altered the definition of "restaurant" in the 
previously mentioned smoking ordinance by increasing the 
acceptable percentage of beverage alcohol from thirty-three 
percent to fifty percent. 168 As a result, entities that patrons 
. believed were bars essentially transformed into restaurants 
and thus, became subject to the ordinance restricting 
smoking. 169 
Courts also utilize sales percentages to determine if the 
business is run according to the primary purpose set out in a 
contract or statute. When a landlord brought an action for 
breach of a lease in Ray-Ron Corp. v. DMY Realty Co., the 
Supreme Court of Indiana evaluated whether the tenant was 
using the premises outside the permitted use of the restaurant 
when he installed arcade games. 170 The court used sales 
percentages to determine whether the "commonly understood 
meaning" of restaurant precludes a proprietor from providing 
any more than food or drink. 171 Although the lease did not 
require a certain percentage of sales, the Supreme Court of 
Indiana reasoned that a pizza entity did not breach its lease by 
having video games on the premises, because it received 
ninety-four percent of its revenue from food and drink sales.172 
In addition, the court stated, arbitrarily, that if the pizza 
restaurant were to derive two-thirds of its income, instead of 
166 Rose Ltd. Liability Co. v. Watertown Planning, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2710, 
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). 
167 Samara Kalk Der, Smoking Debate Heats Up; Restaurateurs Cool to New Rules, 
THE CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at lA. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Ray-Ron Corp. v. DMY Realty Co., 500 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Ind. 1986). 
171 Id. at 1166. 
172 Id. 
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the actual six percent, from video game machines, then it 
might be in violation of its lease.173 To preclude the use of the 
arcade games, the landlord should have prohibited any sales 
outside food and beverage in the lease. 
Even though sales percentages help determine how an 
operation is being run or how it is expected to function, they 
can be difficult to track and often do not reflect the true intent 
of the parties,174 Further, many courts dislike using sales or 
other ratios as the controlling factors in the determination 
because doing so can induce an entity to conform its internal 
business operations to the specified percentage ratio. 175 
3. Space Allocation 
Authors of contracts, legislators, and courts may specify 
the definitions of hospitality terms of art with physical space 
allocation. The capricious nature of this requirement is a 
battle for courts and parties. For example, in Newport Beach, 
California, an entity that uses thirty-two percent of its space 
for nude dancing is considered a cabaret, and thus, a non-
permitted use under the city's ordinance. 176 If that same 
proprietor reduced the space used for nude dancing down to 
twenty percent, use of the premises would be considered an 
eating entity, which is approved under the ordinance.177 
In addition, the overall goal of a contract or statute is 
compromised when relying on space allocation. For example, 
in State ex reI. Edmond Meany Hotel, Inc. u. City of Seattle, an 
owner contracted to sell its fourteen story hotel to a retirement 
home.178 The city claimed the new use constituted a non-
permitted "home for the retired" and not an allowable 
"hotel."179 The relevant statute defined the "hotel" as using 
"fifty percent of its habitable floor area for sleeping."18o The 
173 Id. 
174 See generally Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tex. App. 
1989). 
175 Id. 
176 Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
177 Id. 
178 State ex reI. Edmond Meany Hotel, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 402 P.2d 486, 487 
(Wash. 1965). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 489. 
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city contended that since the retirement home did not utilize 
this percentage of space, it was an unacceptable use.18l 
Although the retirement home was not permitted for other 
reasons, the court declared that a building is not a hotel merely 
because of a haphazard percentage limiting the area used for 
sleeping in its definition. 182 
4. Name 
In conflicts over the definition of hospitality 
establishments, the name is usually taken into consideration. 
Perhaps the least regarded characteristic of an entity is its 
name,183 such as where the property is listed in the yellow 
pages, how the entity advertises itself or the term is stated on a 
publicly displayed sign.184 The property owner in Friedman v. 
Schindler's Prairie House argued that the building was not a 
hotel under an applicable fire-safety statute.l85 The New York 
Civil Court found the name "house" instead of "hotel" was not 
determinative of its genuine nature.186 Therefore, although 
what an entity is called is often taken into consideration, 
generally, it is not controlling in determining whether the 
entity falls within the definition.187 
The actual characteristics of an operation carry more 
weight than the name in determining whether the entity comes 
within the legal definition.188 In Schindler's Prairie House, the 
court examined the other characteristics of its operation, which 
included an office, a large dining room, a thoroughly equipped 
kitchen, a billiard room and a dance hall. 189 The court 
reasoned that guests of hotels are often furnished not only with 
lodging, but meals and entertainment, including music, 
dancing and certain sports.190 Since the maintained building 
181 Id. at 488. 
182 Id. at 499. 
183 Nelson v. Johnson, 116 N.W. 828 (Minn. 1908). 
184 See generally Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's Inc., 416 A2d 388, 390 (N.J. 1980). 
185 Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 AD. 232, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). 
186 Id. at 236. 
187 Moyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 A2d 311, 318 (Me. 1967). 
188 Id. 
189 Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 AD. 232, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). 
190 Id at 236. 
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encompassed these characteristics, the court held that the 
hotel fell within the meaning of the statute.191 
IV. PROACTIVE DESCRIPTION 
As shown above, reliance upon terms of art, dated 
historical definitions or "commonly understood meanings" of 
hospitality establishments is not an effective method when 
drafting contracts or statutes. Instead of allowing courts to 
determine which factors are appropriate for hospitality 
entities, authors should utilize descriptions of authorized uses 
and restrictive covenants to clearly establish the parameters of 
a permissible operation. Rather than trying "to distinguish 
between all the major hospitality entities, the proactive 
descriptions set forth below have collapsed the terms of art into 
the two categories of "lodging" and "food and beverage." The 
following are examples of permitted uses or restricted 
covenants that should be considered and utilized when drafting 
contracts or statutes to avoid conflicts. 
Accommodations 
Overnight 
Minimum Number of Hours 
Minimum Number of 
DaysfW eekslMonthsPayment 
Guest . 









5. Private Bath in Room 
6. Computer Outlets 
7. V· 
191 [d. at 236-7. 
The Sale of Food Prepared 
On Site 
Menu 






Sale of Alcoholic Beverages 
1. Beer by the Glass (tap) or 
Bottle 
2. Wine by the Glass or Bottle 
3. Liquor by the Drink or 
Bottle 
4. Price Restrictions/Happy 
Hours 
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Common Ingress and Egress 
Specific Types of Entertainment 
Allowed 
1. Sporting Activities 
2. Music 
a. Pre-recorded music 
b. Disc-Jockey 
c. Types of Live 
Music 
d. Volume Level 
Allowed 
3. Dancing 
a. By the Public 
b. By Employee 
c. Allowable Square 
feet dedicated to 
dance floor 
d. Allowable number 
of dance areas 
e. Clothing 
requirement 
4. Health Club 
5. Pool 
6. Tennis Courts 
7. Spa Services 
8. Hours of Op_eration Allowed 
Extent of Food and Beverage service 
1. Restaurant on site 
2. Room Service 
3. Bar 
4. Outdoor Dining/Beverage 
Service 
5. Mini-Bars in Rooms 
6. On/Off Premises Catering 
Extent of Other Services 
1. Laundry 
2. Concierge 
3. Child Care 
4. Valet/Self-Parking 
Objective Quality Criteria 
Established by the AAA and Mobile 
Rating Guide 
Dancing 
1. By the Public 
2. By Employee 
3. Allowable square feet 
dedicated to a dance floor. 
4. Allowable number of dance 
areas 
5. Clothing Requirement 






machine strobe lights) 
Pre-recorded music 
Disc-Jockey 
Types of Live Music 





Hours of Operation 
Parking 
Objective Quality Criteria 
Established by the AAA and Mobile 
Rating Guide 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Assuming that hospitality terms in contracts and statutes 
are self-explanatory leads to serious and unexpected 
consequences. Non-descriptive terms of art often lead the court 
to use historical definitions and "commonly understood 
meanings" to interpret the intent of the parties and legislators. 
Due to the ever-changing nature of the hospitality industry, 
"commonly understood meanings," such as "restaurant" or 
"hotel" are not so common anymore. Historical definitions are 
outdated. Since this approach results in unpredictable 
outcomes, legislatures and contracting parties should instead 
be more specific when drafting. Utilizing restrictive covenants 
and specific permitted uses enhances the ability to draft 
definitions that are consistent with the intent of all interested 
parties. All affected stakeholders can incorporate any 
intentions in the contract or statute with a proactive utilization 
of the descriptions set forth in Part IV.l92 The use of these and 
other applicable permitted and restrictive covenants prevents 
litigation because it allows drafters to communicate their 
purposes and assist interested parties to appreciate the 
designed expectations or limitations. 
Andrea Bastian· and Stephen Barth·· 
192 See supra text and accompanying chart 
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